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Sunday, August 31. 2008
People rarely die. Even after their heart stops beating, something about them usually keeps influencing the living and future generations in some small or big way, whether or not that influence is a good one. Someone like Stephanie Tubbs Jones did not have the capacity to die, but she did leave the planet on August 19, of a ruptured brain aneurysm that happened the day before. Joe Biden suffered the same injury two decades ago, but recovered. In late July 2005 on a plane returning to Maryland from depositions of federal employees in Cleveland, I met Stephanie Tubbs Jones sitting next to me. Before I knew she was a member of Congress -- I still carry strong presumptions against politicians, and, to boot, she previously prosecuted and judged -- I was impressed by how genuinely (as it appeared to me) and effectively she engaged so many of the passengers boarding the plane. They were her constituents. I do not know what pet political issue I raised with her -- possibly opposition to the criminal sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimum sentences, the general overall unfairness of the criminal justice system, marijuana legalization, or drug decriminalization -- but she was happy to have an engaging and meaningful conversation on the topic that I chose. Stephanie was genuinely upbeat about life and people. She told me that when she would conduct wedding ceremonies, she would recite the Indian wedding prayer. This prayer means so much to me that I spoke it to my wife at our wedding. For that alone, I very much appreciate Stephanie. Stephanie was only thirteen years older than I when she passed. I send my condolences and best karma to her survivors, including her son Mervyn Jones, II. Jon Katz.
Friday, August 29. 2008
Bill of Rights. (From the public domain.) Earlier this month, the Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants in a libel case against a radio announcer (and his company) who had brusquely uncomplimentary words about the company's actions in Iraq while on contract at Abu Ghraib for such actions as conducting interrogations on behalf of the United States government. Caci Premier Tech., Inc. v. Rhodes, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 16576 (4th Cir., Aug. 5, 2008). In affirming summary judgment, the Fourth Circuit said: "To survive summary judgment, CACI must have forecast clear and convincing evidence that Rhodes made the statement with a high degree of subjective awareness of its probable falsity. In light of the evidence suggesting CACI's involvement in other abuses at Abu Ghraib and the credible sources identifying a contractor as the perpetrator of the child rape, the record does not support a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Rhodes levied the accusation recklessly. It is the absence of sufficient evidence of Rhodes's state of mind, and not any testament to the actual veracity or justifiability of her statement, that makes summary judgment appropriate here." Jon Katz.
Thursday, August 28. 2008
Bill of Rights. (From the public domain.) Many of my clients complain that the police never read them their rights. I wish the police always had that obligation when questioning a person, but that is not the situation. Generally, the police must advise a suspect of his or her Miranda rights if the suspect is in custody; if not, the failure to so advise is grounds for suppressing the defendant's statements to the police. Following are a few key court opinions that address when the police do and do not need to advise suspects of their Miranda rights, and how those rights need to be asserted - Once Miranda rights are invoked, they remain invoked until the in-custody suspect initiates communication. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880 (1981). This is even the situation when the suspect is a convict who demands an attorney's presence during questioning, the case goes cold, and police return to question the suspect in the same prison system from which s/he has never been released. Shatzer v. Maryland, __ Md. _ (Aug. 26, 2008). - The trial judge in the Lee Boyd Malvo sniper prosecution initiated in Fairfax County, Virginia, ruled that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense-specific, and cannot be invoked by one's attorney for future criminal charges that have not yet been filed. For that reason alone, said Virginia trial judge ruled that Mr. Malvo's Miranda rights in Virginia state court could not be asserted by his Maryland federal court-appointed lawyers. As the newspapers confirmed, Malvo wagged his tongue so much that he guaranteed himself the conviction and life without parole sentence that he received. Commonwealth of Virginia v. Malvo, 2003 Va. Cir. LEXIS 188, 63 Va. Cir. 22 (2003). - Miranda rights need not be automatically given to those present in a house being searched pursuant to a warrant. The Ninth Circuit recently said that "several factors are relevant to whether the circumstances of [the defendant's] interrogation effected a police dominated atmosphere: (1) the number of law enforcement personnel and whether they were armed; (2) whether the suspect was at any point restrained, either by physical force or by threats; (3) whether the suspect was isolated from others; and (4) whether the suspect was informed that he was free to leave or terminate the interview, and the context in which any such statements were made." U.S. v. Craighead, __ F.3d _ (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 2008). Craighead further observed: "If a reasonable person is interrogated inside his own home and is told he is 'free o leave,' where will he go? The library? The police station? He is already in the most constitutionally protected place on earth. An interrogation conducted within the suspect’s home is not per se custodial. See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 342-43, 347 (1976). On the contrary, courts have generally been much less likely to find that an interrogation in the suspect’s home was custodial in nature. United States v. Ritchie, 35 F.3d 1477, 1485 (10th Cir. 1994); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 6.6(e) (3d ed. 2007)." . U.S. v. Craighead, __ F.3d _. Thanks to Scott Greenfield for discussing this Craighead case. - Unless a state's constitution is more protective than the federal Constitution, a police officer's questioning after a traffic violation stop generally does not, at the early stages, trigger a need to give Miranda warnings, because the stop and initial questioning, by themselves, do not put the suspect in custody that would require the Miranda warnings. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S. Ct. 3138 (1984); McAvoy v. State, 314 Md. 509, 551 A.2d 875 (1989). What to do with the many times courts do not require Miranda rights? For starters, how about if each of us puts slogans on our cars, t-shirts and front doors proclaiming "Say no to police questioning and police searches." No means no. Jon Katz
Wednesday, August 27. 2008
Bill of Rights. (From the public domain.) Today's blogpost follows up on yesterday's entry insisting on protecting demonstrators' rights at the Democratic and Republican presidential conventions. Here are some useful links for assessing and responding to the protest issue in Denver: - Added to my blogroll is this admittedly biased blog devoted to coverage of demonstrations and the police at the major party presidential conventions. Thanks to TalkLeft for bringing it to my attention. - Here is a gruesome place set up for police to process arrested demonstrators. The ACLU blog discusses the detention center here. - This YouTube page claims to show dozens of clips of recent demonstration activity and police response in Denver. - Police public relations Groupthink gaffes often comes when they arrest reporters covering the action. Thanks to TalkLeft for covering this story. - See Wolf Blitzer editorialize in favor of strong security while saying little to nothing about demonstrators' First Amendment and criminal defense rights, offset by his colleagues somewhat counterbalancing Blitzer, and including ominous footage from the 1968 Chicago Democratic Convention. Did 1968 failed Democratic presidential candidate Hubert Humphrey lift even a finger or a word to stop the police abuse inside and outside the Chicago convention site? If not, would he have reversed his narrow loss to Nixon had he stood up firmly, vocally, and effectively against the police abuse, thus perhaps obtaining more support from those who favored Robert Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy for president? Then again, the Vietnam War was then raging, which presented a huge challenge for him to obtain more than grudging support from strongly antiwar Democrats, while he served as Vice President under Johnson who kept the Big bloody Muddy going. Jon Katz ADDENDUM: Scott Greenfield weighed in on the protestor matter on August 28.
Tuesday, August 26. 2008
An August 26, 2008, video of demonstrators in Denver, including the police blocking the exit of hundreds of people on a city block (near the last third of the video), including plenty of non-demonstrators who just happened to be present. Where was the mainstream media when this was happening? In recent years, no matter who runs for the Tweedledum/Tweedledee Democratic/Republican tickets, the presidential nomination conventions, campaign stops, and inaugural coronations are surrounded by assaults on the First Amendment right to demonstrate. (If you disagree with the brothers Tweedledum/Tweedledee reference, are Obama and McCain more materially the same than they are different? Yes, I am voting for Obama to have a less oppressive and less militaristic government than McCain would bring and maintain, but Obama will heavily support business as usual with the military-industrial-government complex; the failed and oppressive drug war that runs roughshod on the Constitution; the legalized murder of the capital punishment system; the oppressiveness of the PATRIOT Act, and countless other government assaults on civil liberties and democracy. Does the two-party-dominated system sufficiently support a truly democratic and just society? I think not.) Typically, and currently in Denver, convention demonstrators are kept blocks away from the convention site, nullifying the very purpose of their demonstrations. The same is sure to happen at the Republican convention. Also typically, presidential coronations, I mean inaugurations, lately have been examples of Soviet-style clampdowns on protestors and well-choreographed sanitized inaugural parades. Certainly official clampdowns on and intimidation of demonstrators in the United States go far beyond presidential politics. As I have witnessed firsthand, police have a repeated habit of taking repeated close-up photos and videos of demonstrators at large demonstrations against presidential policies in Washington, D.C.; the police purport merely to be gathering evidence, but I have trouble believing that their actions are not also calculated to intimidate. During the April 16, 2000, weekend anti-World Bank/IMF protests, when I spent an entire Saturday defending arrested demonstrators at their bond hearings in the District of Columbia Superior Court, on my way to the nearby federal courthouse, I challenged a couple of police officers on an eerily mainly deserted street whether there was any purpose for their being dressed all in black with boots other than to intimidate; they did not answer. On the Friday late afternoon after the September 11, 2001, massacres, I saw military vehicles rolling down K Street a few blocks from my law school (granted, probably not intended to intimidate demonstrators, but a reminder of how much the United States is not safe from martial law government and martial law tactics). In the early Nineties on one of the many protest weekends -- most weekends in Washington are booked with one or many demonstrations, running from tame flag-waving events to strong opposition to one or many government policies and actions -- I saw a fatigue-wearing soldier on the street corner in front of the Treasury Department. During the September 2007 anti-Gulf War II demonstration in Lafayette Park, I saw cops not only at the ready to use force if ordered to do so, but also roaming in the crowd of peaceful demonstrators on the road that for years always has been closed to traffic in front of the presidential palace. On July 14, 2008, I wrote about the public indifference -- but likely complicity if not downright participation -- ordinarily shown by presidential candidates and other high-profile politicians towards First Amendment violations against demonstrators protesting those politicians. Do McCain and Obama approve of such clampdowns? Will they voice their opinion on this matter, whatever are their opinions? Will they speak out for greater protection of demonstrators at their conventions, campaign stops, inauguration, and beyond? I am not holding my breath, including because their very discussion of the issue acknowledges the severe problem, and, in their silence, perhaps they hope the issue will stay off most voters' radars. Do not let them do it. Jon Katz. ADDENDUM: Thanks to a fellow listserv member for posting the above-displayed video.
Monday, August 25. 2008
Bill of Rights. (From the public domain.) What should a criminal defense lawyer do when his or her client is caught with a bunch of drugs, unlawful weapons, and other contraband, but the prosecutor only files criminal charges on the drugs? On the one hand, resolving the drug case might make the other potential charges go away by keeping attention away from the other possible charges. On the other hand, the defendant might become the victim of successive indictments. A crystal ball would come in handy here. A prosecutor is not automatically required by the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause to indict all at once for crimes discovered on the same date against the same defendant arising from the same operative facts. Maryland's highest court made this clear today in reversing a trial judge's dismissal of a felony prosecution where the defendant had already been convicted on a drug charge relating to the same search that turned up the weapons that were later prosecuted in court and which became the subject of the trial court's reversal. Colonel Preston Long v. Maryland, __ Md. _ (Aug. 25, 2008). This situation underlines the importance for criminal defense lawyers to decide whether to include or exclude uncharged criminal conduct in plea negotiations. On the one hand the uncharged conduct may go out of sight and out of mind if not mentioned. On the other hand, because the uncharged criminal conduct may not go away, the client needs to be involved in the decision whether to stay silent on the uncharged conduct in any guilty plea negotiations. Why, though, would a prosecutor remain silent about uncharged criminal conduct during guilty plea negotiations, as opposed to dangling them in front of the defense lawyer in an effort to try to persuade the defendant to enter a guilty plea? Jon Katz ADDENDUM: Guilty plea negotiations are part of the harsh reality of criminal defense. One side of me dislikes guilty pleas very much. However, a criminal defense lawyer is obligated to do as much good and as little harm for a client as possible, always coming from a position of strength. For instance, if I can get a misdemeanor disorderly conduct guilty plea agreement from a client caught redhanded setting a building on fire, that might just be a big defense victory.
Sunday, August 24. 2008
Image from Library of Congress's website. Here are some useful links that are destined for addition to my links page. - British Columbia's Supreme Court gives protections against drug laws to drug-addicted people. PHS Community Services Society v. Attorney General of Canada, 2008 BCSC 661 (decided May 2008). - An excellent sample Freedom of Information Act request letter, from the American Civil Liberties Union. - The District of Columbia's Criminal Record Sealing Act of 2006. The D.C. Public Defender Service has a free information packet with sample motions for those wishing to file pro se, by calling or visiting PDS. For sealing in jurisdictions bordering D.C., Maryland's expungement application process is the simplest, generally requiring the completion of two triplicate one page forms. Virginia's sealing procedure requires filing an entirely new lawsuit for such relief. An attorney should be consulted before applying to seal or expunge criminal records, particularly by people who are not United States citizens and who need to have their criminal records reviewed periodically for such matters as security clearances. Jon Katz.
Friday, August 22. 2008
In the middle of the then-four week Trial Lawyers College in its second year, I asked myself: "I have come all the way to a ranch in Wyoming miles from the nearest paved road to learn that the essence to being a great trial lawyer is being my same real self in all situations, loving myself and others, not giving up my power to others, and crawling under the hide of those I am trying to persuade, represent, and battle? Could I not have just had that written in pamphlet or book form for me to read?" My doubts continued: "Why are we cross-examining nursery rhyme characters? If I am taking a month of my life here, can we not at least have good pre-printed fact patterns to work from?" By comparison, I immediately was taken the previous summer by the two-week National Criminal Defense College in Georgia. The program was already years in the making and polishing, and it was an accomplishment even to be admitted among the high number of applicants. All fact patterns were well-done and assembled well in advance. Each day we would handle another phase of trial preparation and execution (including client interviews, jury selection, opening, direct exam, cross exam, jury instructions, and closing). At the end of the afternoon, one of the instructing lawyers often would dazzle us in doing a demonstration of what we had just practiced earlier in the day, with the most amazing performances having been demonstrated by SunWolf incorporating a discussion of reasonable doubt into voir dire, talking to the jury as if she were in the box right with them; Lisa Wayne, doing a first-person closing of a winning battered spouse murder case; and Joe Johnson cross examining an expert witness after reeling him into Joe's realm and having him in the palm of his hand to the point of having the expert ready to return a hearty handshake after Joe had substantially diminished his direct testimony. Near the top of those performances was John Delgado, who direct-examined his murder client leading him as smoothly as if he were cross-examining, while pointing his finger at the villains who pressured a false confession, and motioning to the angels with his hand palm-down. There also was cross-examination master Larry Pozner, who at once controls witnesses by adding one new fact at a time to each question if needed, but is still able to do so in a conversational story-telling way that makes witnesses prefer to cooperate with him rather than having him turn one simple question into ten, until the witness succumbs. Ed Mallett demonstrated by example how a true gentleman can effectively enter an objection while doing it politely (to overcome any perceived rudeness of having interrupted the opponent). Crème de la crème came from Andrea Lyon, who did the opening for the battered spouse defense, making it feel like I was in the very house at the very moment when the defendant's husband would abuse his wife for the very last time. Still on the high of the well-organized National Criminal Defense College, I continued trying to make sense of the Trial Lawyers College, which still was in its infancy. As I eventually came to realize, though, both programs have been essential for me. The NCDC focuses on skills, telling a persuasive and coherent story throughout the trial, and being completely committed to and courageous for our clients. The Trial Lawyers College assumes that participants already have the basic skills to try a case, recognizes that each person is only as good a trial lawyer as s/he is a person, and works on simultaneously developing each participant into a better person and trial lawyer. One participant who ended up taking very much to the Trial Lawyers College described it early on as the Mind F_ck, because few people are accustomed to being thrown into a group of four dozen strangers in the beautiful middle of nowhere being rewarded for baring our souls and warts, and being chastised for hiding and candy-coating them. Early on, participants were revealing painful pasts, and pasts and presents of being sexually molested repeatedly by a relative; struggling with low self confidence; coming from dysfunctional families and alcoholism; and the list goes on. It took some time for me to figure out why people would be willing to bare their souls so willingly. One soul-barer told me: "I was so f_cked up at the time, that I would have told my story to anybody." Another told me that his life was changed by doing a psychodrama session on day two in front of the rest of the group. And there I was, waiting a very long time to reveal my warts and being careful whom I revealed them to. I did not much like the possibility of being miserable among a bunch of strangers thinking down on me if I revealed my true self. The opposite took hold, though. I recognized that my problems were pretty small compared to many others, that others would share their feces and pearls of experience with me if I shared mine with them, and that I had found a group of people with whom I could bond and enjoy eliminating the veneers and the cocktail party talk. The more we opened up to each other, the more we bonded, to the point that I can call just about any Trial Lawyers College attendee from any year and get right to a real conversation that skips the cocktail party small talk. When I returned from the Wyoming ranch, I all the more sought out kindred spirits who were not afraid of revealing their true selves versus their Madison Avenue public relations self, who were not afraid to take risks in life and to be true to themselves and their values, and who were not afraid to be real. Did I really need to travel a thousand miles away to learn all this? Yes. The lessons learned there are easy to understand but take long, concerted, and often painful effort to internalize, realize and follow. By learning and applying these lessons full-time in the middle of nowhere among supportive people, I "got it" by the end of the four weeks, and still am getting it. What is all this hype about being real? Consider this. Who will you trust more if you are a juror? A lawyer who comes into the courtroom wearing the fanciest suit and tie who is all polished with every spoken word and every choreographed and pre-scripted step, or the lawyer who looks unremarkable but talks to the jury, witnesses and judge the same way s/he would talk to his or her best friends, without a bunch of notes intervening, and with a heart that cares not only about the lawyer's client, but also about everyone else in the courtroom, and who does not try to hide warts -- aside from needing to keep out damaging testimony through evidentiary and procedural rules -- but instead acknowledges them and persuasively puts them into perspective with the rest of the lawyer's case? Jon Katz
Thursday, August 21. 2008
Bill of Rights. (From the public domain.) Too often, police arrest for disorderly conduct when they cannot think of any other crimes to charge. That is beyond unjust. Fortunately, the Oregon Supreme Court recently put some strong limits on disorderly conduct prosecutions where a suspect allegedly tailgated another car, and called out some choice words to passersby, all over around a five-minute period. Oregon v. William Johnson, __ P.3d _ (Oregon August 14, 2008). Oregon's Supreme Court relied on Oregon's version of the First Amendment in reaching its decision, so it is not clear about the extent to which a similar victory can be achieved in other states. Jon Katz ADDENDUM: Thanks to the person who sent me this Oregon v. William Johnson case.
Wednesday, August 20. 2008
Bill of Rights. (From the public domain.) Police love when suspects drive cars. The driver is bound to violate one traffic law or another, thus justifying a police stop of the car, and an attempt to reveal criminal activity afoot. Police also love to bring "drug" dogs to attempt a justification to search the vehicle. However, a drug dog sniff is only allowed during the time reasonably needed to issue a moving violation citation. If no dogs are available in such a short time, the cops need to manufacture, I mean try to find, reasonable suspicion to prolong the car stop to get a drug sniffing dog's presence. What, however, justifies the cops to hold onto a red-light running violation suspect for thirty minutes? Read this Fourth Circuit opinion that allowed such a lengthy detention based on claimed reasonable articulable suspicion that the court said allowed the police to detain the defendant longer than needed to write a moving violation ticket (running a red light). U.S. v. Branch, __ F.3d. _ (Fourth Cir., August 20, 2008). Fortunately, the dissent in U.S. v. Branch is strongly-worded enough in order to help make headway in getting an en banc reveiw of this case. Meanwhile, if in Virginia, caveat emptor, to say the least. Jon Katz.
Tuesday, August 19. 2008

Image from NASA's website. And now we interrupt the Beijing Olympics with this important public service human rights message: Life is not all fun and games for Chinese dissidents during the Olympics. For instance, within the last few days, blogger Zhou “Zola” Shuguang has been placed under town arrest. As Reporters Without Borders reported on August 15, 2008: "Zola alerted his contacts via the microblogging service Twitter: '16:02 (Beijing time): They have forced me to get into their car. I want my family to be able to confirm what has happened today (...) I am all right, I am in their car and I have the impression that I am being kidnapped.' '17:31 (Beijing time): They have asked me to stay in Meitanba. If I go to Beijing, they will come and get me.' Aged 27, Zola keeps a blog in which he often writes about matters that have been hushed up by the authorities." More on this story also is at the Committee to Protect Bloggers' site. Zhou Shuguang is having a cakewalk with the Chinese authorities, when compared to Beijing human rights activist and blogger Zeng Jinyan and her baby daughter, who, according to ABC online "have been missing since August 7th. Zeng has been under house arrest for months." More on this story is at the Committee to Protect Bloggers' site and in the Associated Press online. That concludes this public service message. Will you now return to the Olympics as if all in China were the Disneyland that the Chinese government so desperately wishes to portray? Jon Katz
Tuesday, August 19. 2008
Bill of Rights. (From the public domain.) For awhile, the Valerie Plame/JoeWilson/Scooter Libby story went on the backburner. Then, in late July 2008, Robert Novak -- whose column blowing Plame's CIA cover led to the prosecution and conviction of Libby -- hit a pedestrian and kept driving, followed by an announcement shortly thereafter of his malignant brain cancer and retirement. Not long thereafter, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit voted 2-1 (Judges Sentelle and Henderson affirming and Judge Rodgers concurring in part and dissenting in part) to uphold the dismissal of Plame's and Wilson's lawsuit against Libby and company over damages allegedly caused by the revelation of Plame's covert CIA status. Wilson, et al., v. Libby, et al., __ F.3d _ (D.C. Cir., Aug. 12, 2008). Plame and Wilson's suit seeks damages for Constitutional violations under Webster Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which is a case governing private party lawsuits against federal officials for Constitutional violations. In affirming the dismissal of Plame's and Wilson's lawsuit, the Court of Appeals stated: "We have discretion in some circumstances to create a remedy against federal officials for constitutional violations, but we must decline to exercise that discretion where 'special factors counsel[] hesitation' in doing so. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396; Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc). In Bivens, the Court implied a remedy where there were no '"‘special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress’"' that required 'the judiciary [to] decline to exercise its discretion in favor of creating damages remedies against federal officials." Spagnola, 859 F.2d at 226 (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396)." Here, the Court of Appeals found that the Privacy Act provided a remedial scheme for Plame and Wilson that precluded a Bivens action. The D.C. Circuit further declared: "Litigation of the Wilsons’ allegations would inevitably require an inquiry into 'classified information that may undermine ongoing covert operations.' See Tenet, 544 U.S. at 11. The amended complaint alleges that the disclosure of Valerie Plame Wilson’s identity 'impaired . . . her ability to carry out her duties at the CIA,' Am. Compl. ¶ 43, increased therisk of violence to her and her family, id. at ¶ 42, and subjected her to treatment different from that given other similarly situated agents, id. at ¶¶ 51–52. We certainly must hesitate before we allow a judicial inquiry into these allegations that implicate the job risks and responsibilities of covert CIA agents. In cases involving covert espionage agreements, '[t]he state secrets privilege and the more frequent use of in camera judicial proceedings simply cannot provide the absolute protection [the Court] found necessary in enunciating the Totten rule.' Tenet, 544 U.S. at 11. Here, although Totten does not bar the suit, the concerns justifying the Totten doctrine provide further support for our decision that a Bivens cause of action is not warranted." Responding to the majority, Judge Rogers wrapped it up as follows: "In conclusion, the court’s decision is not the product of the application of the Bivens doctrine to appellants’ claims as Wilkie directs, 127 S. Ct. at 2598. It is rather the result of the refusal to acknowledge precedent that Bivens is a remedial doctrine and absent special factors applies where Congress created statutory protection for some persons in some circumstances but did not address the type of constitutional claims alleged by Mr. Wilson and in part by Ms. Wilson. The disclosure concerns identified by the court as counselling hesitation are either unfounded or premature because there has been no discovery or presentation by the Wilsons to the district court of how they will attempt to prove their claims. Contrary to separation of powers, then, the court effectively cedes to Congress the judiciary’s defined role to decide issues arising under the Constitution, despite the fact that the Privacy Act neither is nor purports to be a universal bar to all constitutional relief related to the release of agency records. Accordingly, I concur in Parts II and III.B of the court’s opinion, and in the judgment regarding Ms. Wilson’s equal protection and due process property claims, but I respectfully dissent from the affirmance of the dismissal of Mr. Wilson’s First and Fifth Amendment claims against each appellee and Ms. Wilson’s due process state-endangerment claims (except against appellee Armitage), and would leave to the district court to address in the first instance appellees’ defenses of immunity, see, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Davis, 442 U.S. at 249; Butera, 235 F.3d at 646." Judge Rogers' partial dissent/partial concurrence provides very strong arguments to increase the chances of en banc review by the entire District of Columbia Circuit over the very critical issue of when to permit and not permit a Bivens action to proceed forward. Jon Katz.
Monday, August 18. 2008
Bill of Rights. (From the public domain.) One day I asked a prosecutor if she feels any discomfort going against unrepresented criminal defendants, most of whom are not poor enough to qualify for court-appointed counsel but for whom the financial struggle is too great or impossible to hire a lawyer, and some of whom are dilatory in obtaining a court-appointed or private lawyer. She said she feels no discomfort, because she offers all defendants the same guilty plea offers, whether or not represented by a lawyer. Assuming the truth of her assertion, for argument's sake, what happens after she conveys the initial guilty plea offer? A capable criminal defense lawyer will advise the client whether to reject the plea offer, accept it, or return with a counteroffer, and how to time and express any reply. How will the pro se defendant respond? If the case goes to trial, will the pro se defendant represent himself or herself anywhere near as capably as an experienced trial lawyer? Also, the pro se defendant effectively loses the right to remain silent throughout trial. How do prosecutors respond to a counteroffer from a skilled trial lawyer versus from a pro se defendant (and, for that matter, versus a lawyer who is green or about whom the prosecutor knows nothing)? Negotiations are about hedgebetting. Prosecutors have fewer bets to hedge with unrepresented defendants, whom, by definition, are on weaker ground than if they had a qualified lawyer. A case in point came recently when I walked into misdemeanor court, and the prosecutor cheerfully offered for my client to plead guilty to a lesser but still jailable and collateral-risk laden offense. I asked which witnesses were present, and none were. During the break, the prosecutor said the arresting officer in the case was on his way, and urged that his guilty plea offer was the way to go. Probably having had much more time to know my one case versus the prosecutor's two dozen cases, I told the prosecutor that even if the cop arrived, he still had a weak case because of A, B and C, and I said I would not recommend that my client plead guilty to any jailable offenses. The prosecutor ended up dismissing my case later in the day. How would a pro se defendant have handled the foregoing scenario, and how would the prosecutor have responded? Would the pro se defendant have known whether this was a courthouse and case where ordinarily the defendant can get away with waiting for prosecution witnesses to show up before deciding whether to accept a guilty plea offer? Would the prosecutor have told the pro se defendant that the plea offer would be off the table upon the cop's arrival? Would the prosecutor have emphasized the jail risks faced by the pro se defendant by going to trial when the plea offer involved no executed jail request from the prosecutor? Would the prosecutor have argued that the pro se defendant was entering dangerous, uncharted territory to take a case to trial without a lawyer? How do we ameliorate the plight of pro se defendants? One way is to assure that quality court-appointed/ public defender counsel is made available to indigent defendants, and that truly needy defendants are not barred by guidelines or unfair or uneven application thereof that misses them. What do about defendants who are not poor enough to obtain indigent defense counsel but will struggle mightily to pay for a lawyer -- after paying for rent, transportation, children's needs, groceries, and other essentials -- or will not be able to obtain the funds at all? As to the former category of criminal defendant, at least in the past, the Maryland criminal defense bar used to have members who agreed to be part of a "gray panel" that offered reduced rates to such people; such a practice needs to continue. Have indigent defense lawyer application guidelines kept up with today's economic realities of expensive rates for qualified criminal defense lawyers and high prices for gas, food, and other essentials? Should public funds be made available to provide partial subsidies to people who are borderline eligible to obtain indigent defense counsel but do not qualify? Awhile ago, I wrote this piece about the struggles that most ordinary-income people face in paying for quality legal representation. Of course, probably we always will also see a handful of pro se criminal defendants who would not obtain counsel even if they qualified for indigent defense counsel. All criminal defendants have the right to choose their own counsel, including to proceed with self-representation. Caveat emptor. Jon Katz.
Sunday, August 17. 2008
Bill of Rights. (From the public domain.) Congratulations to Philip-Lorca diCorcia for having obtained the dismissal last March of a lawsuit seeking damages for his having photographed the plaintiff when both were on Manhattan sidewalks. This New York Times article gives a detailed rundown. Jon Katz.
Friday, August 15. 2008
Bill of Rights. (From the public domain.) Recently during a suppression hearing in a drug case, the police officer testified that controlled dangerous substances fell to the ground from my client's pants as the cop conducted a patdown for weapons, on the cop's claimed belief that this was a valid Terry stop. During cross examination at the suppression hearing, I asked the cop to show how my client was frisked, by putting me into the role of the client, which gave the judge a good bellylaugh as he proclaimed that I would be responsible for any contraband found during the cop's patdown of me in court. This so-called patdown demonstration revealed the very manipulation that is prohibited with Terry patdowns. The judge later indicated he tended to agree with me that the cop had demonstrated an unlawful Terry patdown, but the judge had concluded that the officer had probable cause to search based on the alleged odor of unburnt marijuana (I join the argument here that unburnt marijuana ordinarily is too hard to distinguish from lawful substances). Probable cause does in fact permit squeezing and sliding of suspected contraband, but a Terry stop does not allow that. About the limits of a Terry frisk, in Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 378 (1993), the Supreme Court upheld the suppression of the drugs seized from Mr. Dickerson's pocket, the Supreme Court explained: "Where, as here, 'an officer who is executing a valid search for one item seizes a different item,' this Court rightly 'has been sensitive to the danger . . . that officers will enlarge a specific authorization, furnished by a warrant or an exigency, into the equivalent of a general warrant to rummage and seize at will.' Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 748 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). Here, the officer's continued exploration of respondent's pocket after having concluded that it contained no weapon was unrelated to 'the sole justification of the search [under Terry:] . . . the protection of the police officer and others nearby.' 392 U.S. at 29. It therefore amounted to the sort of evidentiary search that Terry expressly refused to authorize, see id at 26, and that we have condemned in subsequent cases. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1049, n.14; Sibron, 392 U.S. at 65-66." Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 378. How, then, can a proper Terry frisk -- which is not permitted to involve manipulation, sliding or squeezing -- determine the presence of crack cocaine in one's pocket? If the crack rock is the typical small one-dose size, it sounds particularly farfetched. Nevertheless, in one Virginia criminal case, a police officer claimed to have felt apparent crack cocaine in Mr. Dickerson's pocket during a Terry patdown. The trial judge refused to suppress, and so did Virginia's intermediate appellate court, the Court of Appeals. See Bandy v, Virginia, _ Va. App. _ (August 12, 2008). Something sounds seriously wrong here, and I hope the defense seeks appellate relief. Jon Katz.
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