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Thursday, July 1. 2010

Image from National Institute of Standards & Technology. A silver lining in the District of Columbia’s breathalyzer debacle is that it may further convince judges and jurors that breathalyzers amount to junk science, or else that their results are highly unreliable, due to unreliability of the machinery, and by the fallibility and sometimes carlessness of humans that maintain and operate them.
I have worked for several years with two Intoxilyzer and Intoximeter experts who confirm that blood testing is more reliable than breath testing to accurately determine one’s blood alcohol level at the time of testing. Of course, the blood alcohol level at the time of driving could be lower or higher than at the time of testing, depending on whether the alcohol absorption process is continuing upward, or if the alcohol dissipation process has already begun. Here are memos –- no doubt heavily reviewed and vetted in advance by D.C. government lawyers to reduce legal liability for what is said, and to minimize legal liability for not saying enough -- from D.C. Deputy Attorney General Robert J. Hildum (June 4, 2010) and from Alexander Pope and Darryl Priestly of the D.C. police (April 1, 2010, and not an April Fool's joke). Thanks to a colleague for forwarding me these documents, which were also provided to me recently by a D.C. assistant attorney general.
By Jon Katz, a criminal defense and DWI defense lawyer practicing in Fairfax County, Virginia, Montgomery County, Maryland and beyond. 301-495-7755. http://katzjustice.com.
Thursday, June 10. 2010

Image from National Institute of Standards & Technology. Earlier this year, I blogged about Washington, D.C.’s breathalyzer machine debacle.
This week, D.C. officials admitted that almost 400 people were convicted with the inaccurate machines. Worse, half of them went to jail, usually for at least five days, as reported by the Washington Post today.
D.C. Attorney General Peter Nickles said that the Metropolitan Police Department’s breath testing machines were mis-calibrated by twenty percent by the officer maintaining the machines. This means, for instance, that instead of showing a blood alcohol level of 0.07 (which is below the 0.08 legal limit), the machine would show a result of at least 0.084.
Breath testing machines are fraught with inaccuracy risks, and must be meticulously maintained, repaired and recertified (being machines, they will wear down). They should only be used -– if at all -– to screen whether to take a blood test, which is much more accurate than breath testing, when done properly. This is akin to dipstick tests for drugs in urine. If the dipstick does not change color in the urine, that is a passing test. If the dipstick changes color, the urine needs to be sent to a lab for a proper analysis.
When judges are skeptical about my insistence that breath test results not be admitted into evidence without the testimony of the person who calibrates the machinery, I can include this Washington Post article among the arguments supporting my position. This debacle in Washington, D.C., is doubtfully limited to D.C. itself. The debacle results from human error (if not from human malice or laziness, as well) that can happen anywhere, and that has already harmed hundreds of lives (at the very lease) of defendants wrongfully accused with faulty breathalyzer tests. By Jon Katz, a criminal defense and DWI defense lawyer practicing in Fairfax County, Virginia, Montgomery County, Maryland and beyond. 301-495-7755. http://katzjustice.com.
Thursday, April 8. 2010
Recently, I posted a lawyer listserv message asking about Maryland-licensed alcohol education programs that will not do a knee-jerk at a 0.15 breathalyzer test result to draw the line between a six-session (two hours per session) and twenty-six-session alcohol education program. When a colleague responded that some judges may ask some direct questions about why a program lists the defendant as just a social drinker rather than problem drinker with a 0.15 result, I replied: Some of my Maryland-resident clients have pending Virginia DWI cases. In Virginia, a DWI conviction requires completing the VASAP program (which usually is just around 12-16 weekly sessions for those without prior convictions), which will ordinarily give full credit to any private state-licensed program that my client goes to.
Judges in Virginia have not questioned social drinker assessments from the private programs my clients attend. They let VASAP assure the program is completed.
Moreover, it is B.S. for the 0.15 to be treated as gospel by the alcohol programs when we know how unreliable is the Intoximeter, and how the BAC at the time of the blow can be higher than the BAC at the time of driving.
By the way, recently a clinician at a state-licensed Maryland alcohol education program faxed me a March 2000 Maryland Health Department memo saying "Offenders who have a BAC of .15 or above, or refused the Breathalyzer, should be assessed as a 'Problem Drinker'". The foregoing language says "should" assess, not "must assess" as a problem drinker. What biased language the memo has about "offender", which is bad enough for convicted people but worse for those not even adjudicated guilty yet.
The memo says nothing about the reliability of the Intoximeter. It's all B.S. at best. The current DWI enforcement system and scheme is a shameful fraud.
Tuesday, March 23. 2010

Image from National Institute of Standards & Technology. Particularly now that Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527 (2009), has become firmly entrenched in the Constitutional landscape, Sixth Amendment challenges to machine-based speed calculations should be more persuasive than ever when the people who calibrated the machine do not testify live at trial. Virginia, for instance, has the following statutory provision for the admissibility of testimony on such machines as lasers and radars: "The speed of any motor vehicle may be determined by the use of (i) a laser speed determination device, (ii) radar, (iii) a microcomputer device that is physically connected to an odometer cable and both measures and records distance traveled and elapsed time to determine the average speed of a motor vehicle, or (iv) a microcomputer device that is located aboard an airplane or helicopter and measures and records distance traveled and elapsed time to determine the average speed of a motor vehicle being operated on highways within the Interstate System of highways as defined in § 33.1-48. The results of such determinations shall be accepted as prima facie evidence of the speed of such motor vehicle in any court or legal proceeding where the speed of the motor vehicle is at issue.
"In any court or legal proceeding in which any question arises about the calibration or accuracy of any laser speed determination device, radar, or microcomputer device as described in this section used to determine the speed of any motor vehicle, a certificate, or a true copy thereof, showing the calibration or accuracy of (i) the speedometer of any vehicle, (ii) any tuning fork employed in calibrating or testing the radar or other speed determination device or (iii) any other method employed in calibrating or testing any laser speed determination device, and when and by whom the calibration was made, shall be admissible as evidence of the facts therein stated. No calibration or testing of such device shall be valid for longer than six months." Va. Code § 46.2-882. Certificates of such calibration or accuracy sound like testimonial evidence that is not admissible without live testimony from the people who certified the calibration and accuracy. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527.
Monday, March 22. 2010

Image from National Institute of Standards & Technology. An officer arrested a man for DWI on private property, and was not sure whether he would mention the possibility of taking a breathalyzer test, not knowing whether Virginia's implied consent law for taking a breathalyzer test applied. After the defendant's arrest but before the officer mentioned any breath test, the defendant offered to take a breathalyzer test: When they arrived at the detention center, as the officer was reading the Miranda warnings to him, appellant “brought the subject up and said that he was willing to blow and he wanted to blow.” Up to that point, the officer had not decided whether he would even bring up the breath test, as he was not sure that the implied consent law applied when, as here, a suspect was arrested on private property. However, as the officer put it, appellant “made the decision” for him when appellant volunteered to take the test after being informed of his Miranda rights. Officer Weinstein administered the test, appellant blew into the Intoxilyzer, and the breath test resulted in a BAC reading of .09. Roseborough v. Virginia, __ Va. App. _ (Feb. 16, 2010). The Virginia Court of Appeals ruled 6-5 to affirm Mr. Roseborough's conviction, concluding: We find the officer did not need to resort to the implied consent law to obtain a breath sample because appellant explicitly asked to take the breath test without being informed about the implied consent statute. Thus, as the officer did not rely upon Code § 18.2-268.2(A) to obtain the sample, that statute was irrelevant here and did not require the exclusion of the certificate of analysis. We find the trial court did not err in admitting the certificate into evidence, and, therefore, we affirm appellant’s conviction. The Roseborough dissent responded: Because the accident did not occur on a “highway of the Commonwealth,” the statutory exception to Code § 19.2-81 did not apply, making appellant’s warrantless arrest for driving while intoxicated invalid, as it did not occur in the presence of the arresting officer.28 Therefore, the certificate of analysis of appellant’s breath test was not administered pursuant to Virginia’s implied consent statute, and the trial court erred in admitting it into evidence on that basis. In any event, one moral of the story is not to offer police things they do not request, let alone offering them things they do request.
Friday, March 19. 2010

Image from National Institute of Standards & Technology. Last August, I addressed merger of DUI and DWI per se. As an update, last January, Maryland's intermediate appellate court ruled that "when a defendant is convicted of both DUI and DUI per se, arising out of the same act of driving, the lesser sentence, in this case the one for DUI per se, merges into the greater sentence, in this case the sentence for DUI, under the rule of lenity." Washington v. Maryland, 2010 Md. App. LEXIS 11 (Md. App. Jan. 28, 2010).
Thursday, March 18. 2010

Image from National Institute of Standards & Technology. On March 3, I blogged about attacking horizontal gaze nystagmus testimony. Thanks to JR for commenting to that blog entry with a link to Illinois v. McKown (IL, Feb. 19, 2010) which in part says: "A properly trained police officer who performed the HGN field test in accordance with proper procedures may give expert testimony regarding the results of the test. We also agree with the trial court’s conclusion that a testifying officer may use the HGN test results as a part of the basis for his opinion that the defendant was under the influence and impaired."
McKown had so many experts on each side as to make one wonder whether the parties somehow expected that the case would generate important appellate caselaw. Among the experts testifying for the defense was ophthalmologist Joseph Citron, MD, JD. Dr. Citron apparently is certified in field sobriety tests and available to testify about FST's beyond the horizontal gaze nystagmus. He is in Minnesota at 404-261-2911, 404-386-1100, or 404-784-5297. e-mail: JoeCitron@aol.com. Lawyer Darren Kavinoky lists him here. McKown reversed and ordered a new trial, for the prosecution's failure or inability to lay a proper foundation to admit horizontal gaze nystagmus testimony.
Wednesday, March 3. 2010

Image from National Institute of Standards & Technology. Horizontal gaze nystagmus tests are junk science, but not all judges have the same view. Here are some items to consider in attacking horizontal gaze nystagmus tests: “The cases and literature indicate that, in addition to alcohol, many other factors have been mentioned as a possible cause of nystagmus. They include: (1) problems with the inner ear labyrinth; (2) irrigating the ears with warm or cold water under peculiar weather conditions; (3) influenza; (4) streptococcus infection; (5) vertigo; (6) measles; (7) syphilis; (8) arteriosclerosis; (9) muscular dystrophy; (10) multiple sclerosis; (11) Korchaff's syndrome; (12) brain hemorrhage; (13) epilepsy; (14) hypertension; (15) motion sickness; (16) sunstroke; (17) eye strain; (18) eye muscle fatigue; (19) glaucoma; (20) changes in atmospheric pressure; (21) consumption of excessive amounts of caffeine; (22) excessive exposure to nicotine; (23) aspirin; (24) circadian rhythms; (25) acute trauma to the head; (26) chronic trauma to the head; (27) some prescription drugs, tranquilizers, pain medications, anti-convulsants; (28) barbiturates; (29) disorders of the vestibular apparatus and brain stem; (30) cerebellum dysfunction; (31) heredity; (32) diet; (33) toxins; (34) exposure to solvents PCBS, dry cleaning fumes, carbon monoxide; (34) extreme chilling; (35) eye muscle imbalance; (36) lesions; (37) continuous movement of the visual field past the eyes, i.e., looking from a moving train; (38) antihistamine use. See State v. Witte, supra; State v. Clark, supra; State v. Superior Court, supra; Mark A. Rouleau, Unreliability of the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test, 4 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 439 (1989); Louise J. Gordy & Roscoe N. Gray, 3A Attorney's Textbook of Medicine §§ 84.63 and 84.64 (1990), and other cases and treatises hereinbefore mentioned.” Schultz v. Maryland, 106 Md. App. 145, 180, 664 A.2d 60 (1995). “If the Government introduces evidence that a defendant exhibited nystagmus when the officer performed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, the defendant may bring out either during cross examination of the prosecution witnesses or by asking the Court to take judicial notice of the fact that there are many causes of nystagmus other than alcohol ingestion.” United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 533, (D. Md. 2002).
“We take judicial notice that the results of HGN testing, if the test is properly given by a qualified officer, are admissible to indicate the presence of alcohol in a defendant.” Schultz v. Maryland, 106 Md. App. 145, 174, 664 A.2d 60 (1995).
“ [B]efore HGN testimony can be admitted into evidence the witness must be offered to the court, and accepted by it, as an expert in the field of administering the HGN test.” Maryland v. Blackwell, 408 Md. 677, 696, 971 A.2d 296 (2009) . Jon Katz
Sunday, February 28. 2010

Image from National Institute of Standards & Technology. Breathalyzer tests are junk science. At best, breathalyzer machines should only be used to determine whether to obtain a more thorough blood alcohol screening, through a blood test (or a balloon test, according to one forensic chemist whom I respect very much). This is imperfectly akin to a drug dipstick's positive result not being sufficient, and instead needing a lab test of the urine sample at that point. Underlining the breathalyzer junk science is the Washington, D.C., police chief's revelation this past Friday that eight of ten Intoxilyzer 5000 machines in the city had been delivering inaccurate results between October 2008 and February 2010. What does this mean for people already convicted for DWI from arrests during the October 2008 through February 2010 timeframe? It means they should contact their lawyers immediately about filing for relief from the court from this blunderous situation. Jon Katz.
Tuesday, February 2. 2010
Forensic toxicologists and forensic chemists are common experts for challenging the accuracy and reliability of breathalyzer tests. Sometimes an engineer should be consulted for providing analysis and testimony about the breathalyzer, including testing the breathalyzer with such equipment as an oscilloscope. One engineer who does such work is Thomas E. Workman, Jr. His related article is "Massachusetts Breath Testing for Alchol: A Computer Science Perspective." 8 J. High Tech. L. 209 (2008).
Friday, January 22. 2010
Almost hitting another vehicle is not legal grounds to stop the suspect vehicle, absent sufficiently stated reasonable articulable suspicion for negligent or reckless driving. Lewis v. Maryland, 398 Md. 349, 920 A.2d 1080 (2007).
Wednesday, September 30. 2009
Thanks to the Kavinoky law firm for posting this list of expert witnesses for drunk driving defense. Included in that list is Patrick Demers, whom I have retained several times as an expert witness.
Monday, August 10. 2009
NOTE: This blogposting is being re-uploaded, after some WYSYWIG problems kept delivering faulty formatting. The jurisdictions where I practice criminalize both drunk driving (DUI) and driving with a blood alcohol content over 0.08 (DWI). If a defendant is convicted of both, the defense lawyer should be ready to ask the judge to merge the two convictions, or, in the alternative, the two sentences. In Virginia, it is already understood that only one conviction can arise from a guilty finding for drunk driving and driving with a 0.08 BAC. U.S. v. Hornada, at n. 1 (E.D. Va., Sept. 26, 1997) (Poretz, M.J.) (unpub'd). In Maryland?s, the intermediate appellate court recently ruled that DUI and DWI do not merge as convictions, but do merge for sentencing. Turner v. State, 181 Md. App. 477 (2008), In the District of Columbia, I have not yet had a client convicted both for DUI and DWI, so have not needed to argue merger there. However, the reasoning of the foregoing Maryland Turner opinion should support merging a DUI and DWI sentence, at the very least. In federal court, the DUI cases with which I deal most frequently are for prosecutions under the U.S. National Park regulations, since the National Parks include the George Washington Parkway, Baltimore WashingtonParkway, and the Clara Barton Parkway. A particularly strong argument can be made in the Eastern District of Virginia federal court for merging a DUI and DWI conviction under Park Police regulations, based on the following opinions. The Park Police regulations criminalize DUI under 36 C.F.R § 4.23(a)(1), and DWI under 36 C.F.R. § 4.23(a)(2). E.D. Va. Magistrate Judge Poretz (Ret.) and E.D. Va. Judge Cacheris already have accepted that convictions under the National Park regulations for DUI and DWI merge. U.S. v. Hornada, U.S. Dist. Ct. No. TVN No. P2125951-54; U.S. v. Graham, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40622 (E.D. Va. June 19, 2006) (unpub'd) (approvingly citing U.S. v. Hornada), aff'd, 234 Fed. Appx. 136, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 17573 (4th Cir. Va. 2007) (unpub'd). U.S. v. Hornada carries even greater persuasiveness in the Eastern District of Virginia based on footnote 1, which says that principles of comity encourage such a merger result, where Virginia state DWI law would not allow separate offenses for DWI and DWI per se. Hornada at n. 1. Jon Katz
ADDENDUM: Thanks to a fellow criminal defense attorney for forwarding me the foregoing Hornada opinion. It is unfortunate that per se DWI laws exist in the first place to even be having the foregoing discussion.
Thursday, May 14. 2009

Image from National Institute of Standards & Technology. If you are going to drive after drinking alcohol, why agree to perform the junk science "tests" requested by a cop suspecting you of drunk driving? Ironically, today Maryland's highest court mandated expert testimony to present evidence on the junk science horizontal gaze nystagmus. Does not junk science preclude the possibility of expert testimony? Maryland v. Blackwell, __ Md. _ (May 14, 2009). Yes, if it were not for the slew of courts who do not view it as junk. Enter Maryland's Court of Appeals, which ruled that HGN testimony is expert testimony, and requires that the witness first be qualified as an expert. Blackwell. Consequently, under the Maryland evidentiary rules, if the prosecutor fails to provide a timely and sufficiently detailed HGN expert witness designation, the testimony should be precluded. Similarly, Blackwell presents a concrete hurdle to qualifying the witness as an HGN expert in the first place. As Blackwell confirms: "Furthermore, before HGN testimony can be admitted into evidence the witness must be offered to the court, and accepted by it, as an expert in the field of administering the HGN test. See Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387, 404, 478 A.2d 1143, 1151 (1984) (recognizing that “questions of the qualifications of expert witnesses are for the court to decide as a preliminary matter of law”); MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE, § 702:4 (“Before a witness properly may be asked a question that calls for expert testimony, the witness’ qualifications must be proved and the witness proffered to the court and accepted by it . . . as an expert in the relevant field.” (footnote omitted)). This requirement was undoubtedly satisfied in Wilson, supra, where prior to the officer testifying about his administration of the HGN test to the defendant, the prosecutor stated, “I would like to ask the court to qualify the witness as an expert in the administration of the HGN test and the interpretation based on his training in this matter.” 124 Md. App. at 548, 723 A.2d at 496. The trial judge replied, “The court will find that the witness is an expert in the administering and also evaluating the results of the horizontal-gaze nystagmys [sic] test . . . .” Wilson, 124 Md. App. at 549, 723 A.2d at 496 (alteration in original). One day, courts hopefully will look with a jaundiced eye at horizontal gaze nystagmus. Jon Katz
Friday, March 27. 2009

Image from National Institute of Standards & Technology. In all jurisdictions where I practice law, guidelines call for checking for an empty mouth for at least twenty minutes before administering breath tests for blood alcohol levels, because doing otherwise risks getting an inaccurate result from an already inaccurate procedure. Enter Brenna Guy, who was arrested for suspicion of violating Indiana's drinking and driving laws and asked to take a breathalyzer test. She agreed to take the test, which was administered without the police asking her first to remove her easily removable tongue stud, even though Indiana law has the following rule requiring no mouth foreign substances for at least twenty minutes before taking the breathalyzer test: "The following is the approved method to conduct a B.A.C. Datamaster with keyboard test for alcohol intoxication: (1) The person to be tested must have had nothing to eat or drink, must not [*838] have put any foreign substance in his or her mouth or respiratory tract, and must not smoke within twenty (20) minutes prior to the time a breath sample is taken." Guy v. Indiana, 805 N.E.2d 835, 837-38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Praised be Indiana's Court of Appeals three-judge panel, which ruled 2-1 that the breath test results should have been barred from evidence. The court reasoned that the tongue stud was an easily removable foreign substance that remained in Guy's mouth right through the time of the breath test. The court left for another day what to do with such items as non-removable mercury tooth fillings, crowns, caps, and any other foreign substances that might interfere with the accuracy of the breath test. Guy v. Indiana, 805 N.E.2d 835. The bottom line is that breathalyzers spew inaccurate information all the time. Blood tests are more accurate if properly administered and analyzed, but are more expensive in terms of administering them and in terms of having the people who drew the blood and examined the blood come to court as witnesses. Foreign substances can make breath tests even more inaccurate. It is important for criminal defense lawyers to know about every foreign substance that was in the defendant's mouth, right down to tongue rings, mercury fillings, and tooth caps. Jon Katz ADDENDUM: Thanks to a fellow listserv member for posting on the foregoing Guy case. ADDENDUM II: Thanks to Diane for her comment below. Shepard's did not show the Indiana Supreme Court's reversal of the foregoing Court of Appeals decision, perhaps because the Supreme Court opinion says "[w]e affirm the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress," without saying that the intermediate appellate opinion is being reversed. Here is the Shepard's result, in pertinent part: Guy v. State, 805 N.E.2d 835, 2004 Ind. App. LEXIS 568 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)
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|  | | (CITATION YOU ENTERED): | | | | Guy v. State, 805 N.E.2d 835, 2004 Ind. App. LEXIS 568 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) |
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