Departing the sight of police sometimes permits a stop
Departing the sight of police sometimes permits a stop
Departing the sight of police sometimes permits a stop
Departing the sight of police sometimes permits an arrest, at least when coupled by more than mere flight. As a Fairfax criminal lawyer, I know that the federal Supreme Court in April 2026 found Fourth Amendment-permissible reasonable suspicion for a police officer to stop a car whose passengers fled upon arrival of the police officer at night, where the car’s driver then backed up with a rear passenger door left open. D.C. v. R.W., ___U.S. ___ (2026). At the same time: “We have little doubt that, in some circumstances, an officer could not reasonably attribute his suspicion of a fleeing individual to bystanders milling nearby.” Id.
Merely departing the sight of police, by itself, should not justify a stop by law enforcement officers (LEO)
A key part of courtroom persuasion is to take even prosecutor-friendly appellate court opinions and to find ways those decisions assist criminal defendants. For instance, D.C. v R.W. does not say that merely fleeing upon seeing police by itself justifies a police stop. If nothing else, the totality of the circumstances must be considered. For instance, D.C. v. R.W. considers it significant that R.W. was departing the sight of police while his passenger door was still open, and that his passengers had fled the scene upon the LEO’s arrival.
Why does the Supreme Court permit police seizures for less than probable cause?
The federal Constitution’s Fourth Amendment states: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Over the decades, the federal Supreme court has issued opinions that permit brief investigatory stops so long as the law enforcement officer has reasonable suspicion that the suspect has recently committed or will commit a crime. Departing upon seeing police may be determined by courts — under certain circumstances — may be determined to be with the reasonable suspicion allowed by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Must I remain where I am when police arrive, to avoid a lawful arrest?
The Bill of Rights would be stood on its head to be read to say that a person must not be departing the sight of police. Certainly in D.C. v. R.W., even the dissenting justice — Ketanji Brown Jackson, a former public defender / criminal defense lawyer — did not find the allegations insufficient to justify the stop, but instead opposed the summary fashion in which D.C. v. R.W. reverses the lower appellate court’s decision to suppress the stop of R.W.
Fairfax criminal lawyer Jonathan Katz knows that your criminal defense lawyer needs to be able to capably and persuasively argue such Constitutional issues as violations of the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. Top-rated attorney Jon Katz is available to discuss your court-pending Virginia felony, misdemeanor or DUI prosecution, by a free in-person scheduled consultation about your court-pending prosecution, at 703-383-1100, Info@KatzJustice.com and (text 571-406-7268.
